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TH E  B I O L O G I C A L  structure of certain animals is very similar to that 
of the human body. And there are machines that can reproduce cer-
tain cognitive performances perfectly. It should be possible to com-
bine these facts in building an animal rationale, artificially construct-
ing man out of given components. That such a thought is repugnant 
to the humanistic tradition is hardly a reason for rejecting it out of 
hand. Instead of appealing to some mysterious essence of "being 
human," this tradition should be made to fight in order to make 
clear what it means by its emotionally charged pronouncements 
about man's incomparability to intelligent biomachines. My line of 
thought will in fact lead to the traditional conclusion, but it will de-
mand controversial decisions at some crucial points. The issues raised 
by recent developments in cognitive psychology and artificial intelli-
gence do not simply and inevitably lead to a humanistic dismissal of 
the subject, and I shall be trying to map out the fundamental turnings 
of the road that leads to a conviction that nothing can be compared to 
man.
This conviction sounds both commonplace and arrogant. In ar-
guing it, decisions will have to be made that lead in the desired di-
rection only if the desirability of the result is presupposed. That 
well-known difficulty of hermeneutical reflection is in fact ap-
propriate to this subject matter. The “essence of man” is not a given 
which can be approached by arguments free of prior metaphysical 
bias. There is no hope of avoiding some very partial presuppositions 
in expounding my thesis, and any counterargument might find it-
self in a similar situation. But rather than indulge in mutual polemical 
deconstruction I choose a tentatively edifying procedure: there are 
some very good reasons to hold that recent research does not come 
near to showing that man can be considered as just an extraordinary 
complex artifact.
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Biology will not be a factor in my argument. Since biology is 
a science exemplifying a particular form of cognitive capacity, its 
role within an investigation of what it is to be human is subordi-
nate to the main problem, that of finding out if intelligent behavior 
(such as science) can be produced artificially. The hold on nature 
that would allow us genetically to construct a rational animal as-
sumes a cognitive distance from nature that can be discussed with-
out recourse to biological facts. A highly suggestive current ac-
count of intelligence regards it as something that in principle can 
be generated by "se-mantic machines." Treating certain systems 
(computers, brains) as mechanisms working towards potentially 
meaningful results by purely formal procedures has proved to be a 
fruitful research pro-gram. Think of a jigsaw puzzle. The shape of 
its pieces contains no information about the content of the repre-
sentation that has to be retrieved. Finding out how the pieces fit to-
gether is a syntactic activity that can be performed according to 
formal principles. All those pieces just fit together in the end; but, 
remarkably enough, a picture of something has been assembled by 
this process. Evidently it is possible, by appropriate construction, 
to integrate formal procedures and the more complex relationships 
between signs and their interpretation. A puzzle illustrates seman-
tic machines insofar as it leads to representation of reality in the 
absence of any prior semantic information. It is an appealing para-
digm for someone looking for a link between the neurophysiologi-
cal functioning of the brain and its involvement within the ongoing 
process of figuring out how the world is. If the puzzle of our nerv-
ous system fits together properly, we have thereby arrived at a rep-
resentation of the world. The game has obviously been designed to 
harmonize the syntax of its pieces with the semantics of their re-
sulting configuration. Like-wise evolution is thought to have led to 
a brain design that squares with those external impulses that are in-
terpreted as impacts of "the world."
It is important to be clear about what is meant by semantics in 
this context. An array of formal tokens and types as well as 
manipulative rules is given, and meaning is assigned to it accord-
ing to additional rules, resulting in an interpretation. Correct han-
dling of the pieces of the puzzle leads to something that can be in-
vested with
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overall meaning in accordance with the fragmented meanings that 
(could) have been associated with the basic vocabulary (the pieces of 
the puzzle, in our example). For this account, what material the syn-
tactic system is made of is completely irrelevant. The printout of a 
computer or the sign language of pantomime can be analyzed in ex-
actly the same way: syntactic tokens are produced and related to some-
thing they signify. One of the most ingenious semantic ma-chines, 
Richard Montague's "Universal Grammar," begins with the refusal to 
distinguish between artificial and natural languages. Formal seman-
tics, of which Montague's work is an eminent example, simply has no 
way to mark out any meanings that have to be reserved for use in re-
constructing human behavior. It does not matter for my purpose what 
the semantic universe is usually thought to consist of. But one impor-
tant fact about its construction has to be stressed. Whatever candi-
dates for meanings are considered (individuals, sets, structures, func-
tions from possible worlds, truth values) they are assigned to formu-
las of some given object-language within a meta-language. In order 
to specify an interpretation, the meaningless expressions we are deal-
ing with have to be quoted and given a semantic correlate, as only an 
already functioning language can do.
Obviously the metalanguage must include semantic operations. 
If it only were one more object-language, all that could be done 
would be to coordinate meaningless expressions from one language 
with meaningless expressions from another. Someone ignorant of 
the rules of pictorial representation could discern all the representa-
tional elements in a puzzle, but he would find them quite as senseless 
as the contours of the single pieces. But where can this pre-supposed 
meaning come from? We are approaching the first controversial de-
cision. According to logico-linguistic usage, an isomorphism between 
two structures (one syntactic, one semantic) is all that is needed to 
give meaning to the expressions of a language. What-ever meanings 
are, just arrange them in systematic coordination with your syntax-to-
be-interpreted. Look at the puzzle again. So long as the conventions 
of the syntax and of the metalanguage are observed, meanings can be 
ascribed to its formal constituents. This answer, however, evades 
the original question. It simply presupposes that a usable metalan-
guage is already available, upon whose semantic
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content the expressions of the object-language can be mapped. For-
mal logic is of no further help here, since it has no hold on the dis-
tinction between formal constructions and the actual behavior of 
language users within which they are embedded. But a matter of 
principle has to be decided at this point. Daniel Dennett has sug-
gested that starting from a very primitive level it may be possible to 
reconstruct all human semantical activity as basically consisting of an 
extremely complex formal system expanding the underlying syntax 
and progressively interacting with it. Somewhere along this re-con-
struction the crucial difference between meaningless signs and inter-
pretative activity would have to vanish, giving way to various de-
grees of formal perspicuity. Such a hypothesis clashes with one of the 
intuitions on which the humanistic thesis is founded: every in-
telligible sense of "formal system" implies that such a system has to 
be used by someone in order to have any connection with meaning.
Formal systems by definition are devoid of meaning; they can-
not simply acquire a semantic dimension by chance. Monkeys typ-
ing at random will never produce the last chapter of Ulysses. But 
isn't this to start from too exacting premises? Modest piecemeal re-
construction should lead to a gradual passage from mechanical func-
tioning to configurations that can be endowed with sense. There is, 
however, a conceptual difficulty with this proposal. Isolated formal 
interpretations still remain on this side of sense; genuine interpre-
tations involving the use of language can supply meanings, but in 
this case the metalanguage cannot be considered as a formal system. 
So our choice is between postulating the advent of a "formal system" 
that erases the distinctions on which our present concept of a formal 
system is built, or trying to work out the distinction implicit in the 
conceptual frame we actually use. While the first possibility is an 
exciting stimulus for science fiction, to take it as a starting point has 
the severe drawback that we literally do not know what we are talk-
ing about once we decide drastically to redefine the construction of 
our language. It is fun to experiment with the plasticity of common 
concepts, but the fun comes from the dizzying interplay between 
what we are able to comprehend and what only seems to be com-
prehensible. In short, in keeping apart science and science fiction,
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one is obliged to elucidate the difference between formal operations 
and their application. As J. A. Fodor puts it:
The computer which prints out 
"
Robin Roberts won 28
"
 is not 
thereby referring to Robin Roberts. But, surely, when I think: 
Robin Roberts won 28, I am thinking about Robin Roberts and if 
not in virtue of having performed some formal operation on 
some representation, then presumably in virtue of something 
else.
This "something else" has to be the performance of nonformal ac-
tivities. To this it could be replied that such activities might very 
well be formalizable, as Richard Montague's formal pragmatics and 
context-dependent interpretation in artificial intelligence show. But 
this only restates the underlying conflict: such behavior cannot en-
tirely be formalized without either radically changing the meaning 
of "formalization" or else introducing the same problem one level 
higher up.
Faced with this choice, the humanistic tradition decides to work 
within the confines of the language we currently employ. (Its own 
verbal transgressions will become prominent later on.) It sticks to 
the commonplace assumption, vigorously defended, for example, 
by John Searle, that computers just do not understand the signs they 
are handling. One has to be aware of the thoroughgoing split within 
semantics this entails. Formal ascription of meaning has to be sharply 
distinguished from meaning conferred upon signs by using lan-
guage. Assigning truth values to sentence-tokens and getting some-
one to assent to an utterance are very different activities. It is in fact 
extremely misleading to talk of "meaning" in both contexts. Formal 
semantic theories and theories built on the insight that semantics 
depends on actual verbal utterances are most likely incommensur-
able. The term is useful, nevertheless, in upholding the precarious-
ness of semantics. It is either a discipline that is torn between for-
malization and use or one that submits to unification according to a 
single principle. In arguing the former view I shall find a close con-
nection between the heterogeneous structure of semantics and the 
metaphysical constitution of man. Reducing semantics to formal
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computation, as the latter view does, will turn out to be a modern version of 
explaining everything there is from a utopian point of view that aspires to 
absolute homogeneity.
Among the most famous semantic machines philosophy has ever con-
structed is Wittgenstein's Tractatus. It was supposed to yield a syntax incor-
porating every possible sense in advance of its actual employment. All well-
formed sentences of its ideal language would have been guaranteed mean-
ing by conforming to the unutterable laws of universal logical form. Witt-
genstein found out that this pro-gram could not be realized. It runs into trou-
ble right at the beginning, when an interpretation of the primitive expressions 
of the language has to be given. "Every interpretation together with what it 
interprets is suspended in the air; it cannot serve as its support. Interpretations 
alone do not determine meaning" (Philosophical Investigations) . An en-
tire network of presuppositions taken for granted underlies every successful 
interpretation. Its rules can be sorted out and treated formally, but then the 
problem returns with the at-tempt to specify the meaning of those higher-
order formal expressions. Saul Kripke, in his recent book, Wittgenstein on 
Rules and Private Language, has convincingly outlined this difficulty 
for the formalist. Following a rule of language is an event entirely different 
from the functioning of a preprogrammed machine. Wittgenstein noticed 
the difference between actual language and calculi used for illustrative pur-
poses when he pointed out that "in philosophy we often compare the use of 
words to games and calculi with fixed rules but we cannot say that, whoever 
uses the language, has to play such a game." No written command prevents 
one from using a signpost the wrong way around, and if there were one it 
would itself be subject to countless misunderstandings. Human social behav-
ior is the basis for meaningful employment of signs.
In following these suggestions one finds oneself using language rather 
strangely. It is often said that for a rule to be understood and the meaning of 
an expression to be grasped, there has to be "some-thing in addition to the 
mere unraveling of a program." What might this mysterious capacity consist 
of? Simply positing it in order to
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make up for a presumed lack in the formalistic account is surely 
not enough to allay the suspicion of philosophical obfuscation. 
Wittgenstein keeps stressing the crucial fact that every predeter-
mined scheme has to be applied to contribute to the formation of 
meaning. "What is the criterion for the meaning of the formula? 
The way we permanently use it, how we were taught to use it." 
That does not preclude this use being insufficiently specified or 
changing over time. On the contrary: compared to the rigidity of 
programs, a priori understanding is distinguished by the instability 
of its designs. Misunderstanding has to remain possible for under-
standing to take place. Now such explanations might be taken to 
show that semantic activity does not spring from a secret inaccessi-
ble realm, but they do not clearly indicate how a slogan like "mean-
ing is use" could be turned into a working hypothesis for a feasible 
semantic investigation competing with the proposals mentioned at 
the beginning. The later Wittgenstein was not interested in any at-
tempt to methodically re-construct meaningful behavior along the 
lines he himself suggested. To see what his point of departure im-
plies, one has to switch to hermeneutics, the systematic elucidation 
of nonformal processes of understanding. There is something puz-
zling in our usual confidence that we can comprehend the general 
meaning of a word even if we cannot predict the future circumstan-
ces of its employment: "It be-comes strange when we are led to 
think that the future development has in some way to be present in 
the act of comprehension even though it is not. —Because we say 
that there is no doubt of our understanding this word when on the 
other hand its meaning is its use" (Wittgenstein). Hermeneutics 
deals with precisely this difficulty. It describes how human under-
standing is characterized by the peculiar relation between the intel-
lectual abilities available at a given time, and a general, revisable 
structuring of the world embedding these abilities and being shaped 
by their contribution.
The hermeneutical process starts with fragments of utterances, 
texts, or behaviors that do not make sense by themselves. These are 
the formal elements under consideration now. But quite unlike the 
procedures previously discussed, they are not provided with a cor-
relate called meaning. Instead, hermeneutics describes how they 
are tentatively integrated within the larger context of human ex-
pecta-
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tions, predictions, and activities. Their interrelationship has al-
ready to be in place so as to direct the treatment of the isolated frag-
ments. One has to know about puzzles to handle their pieces prop-
erly. Hu-bert Dreyfus has repeatedly made this Heideggerian point 
against attempts to formalize understanding completely. No bit of 
information can make sense unless it is related to the inexhaustible 
back-ground of being-in-the-world. To exhaust it would put an end 
to what we regard as human dealing with seemingly senseless 
symbols. This claim, it has to be admitted, faces a problem that is 
exactly the reverse of the formalist predicament: whereas the for-
malist can-not explain how sense arises out of pure syntax, the her-
meneuticist must always presuppose sense. It is impossible to give 
an appropriate interpretation without appealing to circumstances 
already "soaked" with sense. And to make things worse, this pre-
supposition leads into a kind of circle: the outcome of the interpre-
tation of the formal elements depends on the choice of back-
ground. Heidegger's phrase, "every exposition leading to under-
standing must already have understood what it wants to explicate," 
suggests precisely what Wittgenstein found puzzling. In order to 
find the meaning of a phrase we have to work with prior knowl-
edge about the way it fits in numerous situations — in fact with 
prior knowledge of its meaning. Needless to say, logicians are 
scandalized by this holistic methodological approach. What be-
comes of objectivity if meaning depends on such a self-stabilizing 
circuit? We have reached the first controversial point from a dif-
ferent angle: it has to be decided how the investigation of mean-
ingful behavior shall be pursued.
There is little room for compromise between the piecemeal 
strategy of formal reconstruction and the holism of hermeneutical 
processes. The best that can be done is to be clear about the impli-
cations of the choice. It is very likely that powerful learning ma-
chines will be built on something like hermeneutical principles, 
absorbing information about the background as feedback to adjust 
their pro-grams to the needs of the context. And on the other hand 
there is nothing to prevent formal semantics, strengthened by for-
malized pragmatics, from describing the logical structure of our 
discourse. But these possibilities should not be allowed to blur the 
fundamental distinction, that remains valid even if they are real-
ized, between
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machines that have to be used by someone and an entirely new kind 
of "machine" that is defined apart from any implied usage. I have al-
ready indicated that whatever those utopian devices may be called, 
they are not machines in any sense comprehensible to me. They 
could perhaps be taken as instruments of the final overthrow of the 
traditional conception of man. Very well, there is no guarantee that 
that conception will last. My point, however, is that in this event no 
concept accessible to us today would remain. One might by way of 
experiment suspend the language-game currently being played to 
make the most basic distinctions about man and his surrounding 
world, but doing so, one should not expect to be left with a concep-
tual scheme compatible with ours. Semantic machines in particular 
cannot be called perfect substitutes for man because it is entirely 
unclear what "man" would refer to if this proposition were accepted. 
It might happen that our intuitions were completely overthrown, but 
arguing on their basis about what would replace them is like trying 
to figure out the quality of heaven and hell. For centuries theolo-
gians kept busy with this task; maybe a similar role is played nowa-
days by science fiction accounts of artificial intelligence.
I have been assuming that we need to choose a theoretical frame-
work (formal semantics, hermeneutics) appropriate to current pre-
conceptions about the phenomenon of understanding. And I argued 
that understanding can be grasped as a human activity only if usage 
of language in addition to its formal signifying potential is consid-
ered. There is an obvious objection to this. Doesn't it amount to de-
ciding upon what understanding is, independent of possible future 
evidence? The refusal to consider the effects an all-pervasive scien-
tific revolution would have on the ordinary concept of man seems 
to arbitrarily privilege the language-game we now happen to have. 
The second major bifurcation is approaching. Holding on to an en-
tirely empiricist perspective, there are few reasons against ingeni-
ously experimenting to do away with the conceptual difference be-
tween man and machine. It is a healthy reminder of the unreliability 
of our everyday notional network that it can be thoroughly confused 
by appearances — animals, machines, and men looking
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and acting indistinguishably from each other. Letting the matter 
rest here means accepting empirical investigation as ultimate re-
sult. This however takes a terribly narrow view of the capabilities 
and needs of intelligent beings. Questions about the legitimacy and 
direction of research programs frequently cannot be answered by 
piling up another load of empirical data. It is quite suspenseful to 
muse about what science will eventually discover about man, but 
another line of thought is at least as important, namely to investi-
gate the conditions shaping our own empirical investigations. This 
cannot be done exclusively empirically, which suggests that some-
thing more than simple pragmatic scientism moves human inquiry 
along. Reflection on the frameworks used in science teaches some-
thing about the extension and limits of responsible research. If cur-
rent basic in-tuitions are just one expendable set of empirical hy-
potheses, this is the end of the search for something distinctively 
human. Only by taking them more seriously can further results be 
obtained.
It might be helpful here to give a very pretentious version of 
the humanistic doctrine, pointing out its peculiarity and 
acknowledging resentment of its speculative character. Man dif-
fers with all the differences incorporated into the design of his the-
ories. He has in-comparable power to invent theories that shape the 
world according to man-made distinctions, but, because they are of 
his invention, such theories cannot serve fully to analyze this in-
ventive activity. The hermeneutical insight into the inevitableness 
of the background is turned into a metaphysical principle by this 
reflection. Being-inthe-world is looked upon as an irretrievable pre-
supposition to all the theoretical constructions man can devise in 
order to cope with the world's problems. I find this a tenable and 
convincing position, though frequently misused for sentimental 
preaching. By presenting the motives behind it while steering clear 
of its pretensions, I hope to minimize its scandal. In doing so I will 
abruptly turn to metaphysical considerations, disregarding the phi-
losophy of science and epistemology, whose contributions to this 
subject would have to be described very carefully and could not 
spare us the question of principle anyway. Man as a peculiar con-
figuration of differences with nature, and with himself insofar as 
he belongs to nature — is this an unfounded fantasy or a working 
proposal for explicating the
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hidden implications of how we orient ourselves amidst the onrush 
of data?
Numerous objections can be made to the apparently un-
founded arrogance of metaphysical thinking. As we just saw, its 
crucial move is to turn away from all formal and empirical exer-
tions and open up a field of investigation, as it were, behind their 
backs. Meta-physics claims to discover something "deep" about the 
"human condition," but what are its own presuppositions? To be 
respectable it has to embody a particular theory itself, and then it 
is bound to exemplify the same limitations it seeks to demonstrate 
in other theories. An extremely dubious appeal to methodological 
superiority is sometimes made at this juncture: philosophy is con-
sidered the most fundamental enterprise of theoretical clarifica-
tion. Yet it has been recognized, at least since Wittgenstein's Trac-
tatus, that all such universal claims rapidly turn into paradox. 
Metaphysics as a theory about theories can hardly be reconciled 
with metaphysics as dealing with all the theories there are. Regard-
ing it as a peculiar supertheory has been a common escape from 
this dilemma. This methodological impasse bears directly on our 
subject because only within the province of metaphysical ques-
tions can man be seen as some-thing unique. But if metaphysics 
leads to paradox or spurious superiority, there seems to be no rea-
son to engage in such an enterprise. My strategy in answering this 
criticism will be twofold. First I will try to alleviate the misgivings 
one feels about the metaphysical project, and second, since its par-
adoxicality cannot be made to disappear altogether, I will turn 
around and face the fact that one has to like it. The phenomenon 
of human existence calls for a description incorporating conflict-
ing elements without any obvious reconciliation of them into a 
harmonious totality.
Searching for the ultimate background from which all human 
endeavor can be derived is a borderline case of an otherwise 
legitimate curiosity. (Now it is the turn of the traditional argument 
to strain ordinary discourse.) It can often be enlightening to look 
beneath the surface of a given distinction. Every theory shows 
traces of its underlying real-life history, and Wittgenstein's re-
marks about the context-dependency of interpretations showed the 
way to develop this hermeneutical truth. Consequently it often is 
through in-
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vestigation of what a certain theory presupposes that a clear picture of 
its functioning and relevance emerges. Only if some methodological 
hierarchy is conceded can such an undertaking make sense. It turns 
out, therefore, that in choosing the hermeneutical approach, we have 
already opted for different levels of intellectual involvement, some 
of them of necessity superimposed on others. In turning to metaphy-
sics one only radicalizes this convenient scheme of thought. Theo-
ries are constructs pointing into two different directions — forward 
to the world they want to render intelligible and backward to their 
own context of origin. My initial point, that formal semantics cannot 
establish contact with meaning on its own, arrives at its full conse-
quence now. A theory as such can only be said to reach out toward the 
world if its design serves the purpose of some-one who knows how to 
use it. If these considerations are assumed, there is no need for a 
spectacular jump into metaphysics, since they are already part of it. 
Metaphysics, understood as a straightforward general analysis of 
what it means to live as an intelligent being, is what this discussion 
has already initiated. No formal or empirical restriction was intro-
duced; slipping into unconditional contemplation of the conditions 
of meaningful behavior seems to have been almost automatic. This 
tempting slip can of course be resisted, but only at the price of los-
ing touch with the intuitions underlying our argument. (And meta-
physics in some way is only systematic justification of some very ba-
sic common beliefs.) Theories are cognitive devices operating be-
tween an extratheoretical background and applications that show the 
world to conform with them. The theoretical status of this pronounce-
ment, however, remains to be discussed. It sounds almost common-
place, and strangely enough, it also smells of contradiction. I charac-
terized the humanistic claim in just this way at the beginning, and 
this is no coincidence. As it turns out, metaphysical method and the 
conviction that man is incomparable with anything else fit together 
perfectly.
Here is a short recapitulation of the trouble with metaphysics. It 
starts by dissociating itself from any other theories, searching out 
their most fundamental presuppositions, to which they themselves
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are necessarily blind. This is the procedure indicated by the meta-, 
meaning beyond the corpus of science and the humanities. And where 
does metaphysics come from? Either it can be treated like an ordinary 
theory, in which case its transcendence collapses, or it has to be 
equipped with some very special set of concepts mysteriously surpass-
ing all others. In trying to find the most general feature of being, philos-
ophy loses its firm ground: reaching out beyond all established investi-
gations, it is immediately thrown back into their confines, where it 
could not rest to begin with. Admittedly this pattern seems to call for 
therapy, which is exactly what many critics have proposed to offer. 
Nevertheless it is against those psychohygienic attempts to dissolve 
the tangle that a final step has to be taken. Its aim is to make intelligible 
the reasons for which attempts to articulate man's understanding of 
the world run into paradox in the end. Metaphysics is the result of not 
shrinking back from this conclusion even though it puts philosophy 
into an awkward position. Confronted with an unmediated rupture of 
intelligibility, it has to get a maximum of sense out of it. Not an envi-
able task, since all attempts to organize the clash between what can 
and what cannot be said are ultimately doomed to fail. But isn't that 
what human life basically consists of, struggling to build domains of 
meaning against the permanent men-ace of their unraveling? Such is 
the cross-connection simultaneously establishing a methodological-ex-
istential link and establishing the origin of metaphysics: it reaches back 
into man's struggle with chaos and lack of meaning. This is the tradi-
tional line. While upholding the claim, I want to strip it of its ideolog-
ical embellishments by analyzing its structure and pointing out its es-
sential fragility.
A widely used paradigm for the problem is the field of vision. 
The eye does not see itself unless a mirror is used. In some sense it can 
then be said to see "itself," but it cannot in principle see its seeing. 
These remarks accord with my previous reflections on the inevitable 
distinction between man and machine. If the process of seeing is not 
distinguished conceptually from what is seen, the language-game sur-
rounding vision threatens to disintegrate. One of its characteristics is 
just such a peculiar combination of an ongoing activity and its circum-
scribed results. If this feature is eliminated (for example, neurophysio-
logically), nothing remains to distinguish vision from
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any nonconscious biological process. Here the initial conflict flares up 
again, but for the sake of illustration only the structure of our in-tui-
tion matters. The paradigm serves to illuminate the working of meta-
physical method and the particularity of trying to cope with cosmic 
inarticulateness at the same time.
Theories lack access to their origins; in order to get a hold on 
them one has to use other theories, like mirrors reflecting the eye. 
This leaves us with the question of how any theory could possibly 
comprehend where theories come from. Just as wanting to see the 
process of seeing shakes the fundament of comprehensible talk about 
vision, this inquiry does not lead to the desired answer: as long as 
something is treated as a theory, it cannot rid itself of the problem of 
its background. One response to this predicament is to deny that 
anything important can be learned from it. Another is to turn it into an 
insight about man: whatever he can take hold of excludes the grip it-
self; it simply is not possible to fix the activity of fixing simultane-
ously with whatever is fixed. Or, to put it once more as a statement 
about our conceptual equipment, abolishing this difference is under-
cutting one of the elementary components of our cognitive appara-
tus. An undramatic interpretation of talk about human in-compara-
bility is suggested by this statement, which paraphrases the fact that 
we stop referring to the same thing when we relinquish this irreduci-
ble duality. And in doing so it affirms that this pattern does not fit 
anything but man.
Not surprisingly, we have found that the uniqueness of man can 
only be established within a framework that has a metaphysical bias 
built into it. Method and its subject matter have to be developed in 
tandem, as hermeneutical principles suggest. There is no essence of 
man outside all possible theories, waiting to offer itself when the 
right one comes along. Pushing certain lines of thought opens up 
perspectives whose range and direction can convince someone that 
the approach is useful. The pivotal point is deciding whether one is 
prepared to face the challenge of something that cannot satisfacto-
rily be thought through. There is no possible continuum between 
science and the need to ask how science comes about at all, as there 
ultimately is no way to think successfully of man as an unproblem-
atic mediation between nature and what is distant from nature. In
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delineating such a harmony one is driven to replace the concept of 
man with what can be referred to as "God" or "utopian machines." In 
the development of such substitutions, the disturbing imbalance be-
tween formal closure and the opening up of new horizons is put to 
rest. Against such a quietism, the neurotic aspects of metaphysical 
striving can be seen as minor afflictions. Man is never safe from the 
impact of the incomprehensible, even though he can be quite suc-
cessful in managing its consequences. This is acutely observed in 
Ridley Scott's film Blade Runner (based on a novel by Philip K. 
Dick), where a man-made "replicant" turns into something human 
by apprehending imminent death. Maintaining this general attitude 
can be regarded as the leading motive for the insistence that man be 
kept strictly separate from machines. His essence is to be able to 
stretch his understanding to this limit — being part of the world and, 
by asserting this, partially dropping out of it. A less crazy diagnosis 
is not feasible in this case. There is no doubt that one wrong step can 
annihilate this passing glory, but why should one blind oneself to it 
in advance? Metaphysics amounts to conceding that our condition 
might make sense ultimately even though we cannot say so without 
serious impediments. This concession leads to a stammering which 
yet contains a message: it is the wound that gives rise to wonder.
